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Abstract 
Recent episodes of housing bubbles, which occurred in several economies after the 
burst of the United States housing market, suggest studying the evolution of housing 
prices from a global perspective. We utilise a theoretical model for the purposes of 
this contribution, which identifies the main drivers of housing price appreciation, as 
for example, income, residential investment, financial elements, fiscal policy and 
demographics. In a second stage of our analysis, we test our theoretical hypothesis by 
means of a sample of 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2011. We employ the vector 
error correction econometric technique in terms of our empirical analysis, which 
permits us to model the long-run equilibrium relationship and the short-run dynamics, 
which also helps to account for endogeneity and reverse causality problems.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The occurrence of several episodes of housing bubbles in a number of 
developed economies in the second half of the 2000s, suggests the necessity of 
identifying the main drivers of this market.  
In order to contribute to the existing debate, we begin by proposing a 
theoretical explanation of housing prices, which puts forward the role of the basic 
fundamentals of this market, for example, disposable income, real residential 
investment, mortgage rates and demographics. Our model also accounts for the 
behaviour of monetary authorities by including credit standards. Moreover, in our 
specification there is room for the public sector to perform its role by means of 
taxation. We then proceed to test the validity of our theoretical model by applying 
cointegration analysis (Johansen, 1995), on a sample of 18 OECD economies during 
the period 1970-2011. Our econometric results assure the existence of a long-run 
relationship among the variables and capture the adjustment in the short run by means 
of a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) – also accounts for endogeneity and 
reverse causality problems.  
In terms of economic policy our analysis upgrades the role of the prudential 
and fiscal policies in relation to monetary policy. Moreover, our results also point to 
disposable income as the corner stone of the model.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a 
review of those contributions, which are relevant to our theoretical model. In section 3 
the econometric technique employed is discussed. Section 4 discusses the data and 
section 5 displays the estimations undertaken for this study. Section 6 discusses our 
results in comparison with other contributions. Finally, section 7 summarises and 
concludes.  
 
2. Literature review of variables of interest 
 
An external shock in demographics, income or changes in the behaviour of 
fiscal or monetary authorities modifies households’ preference for properties. This 
change provokes a disequilibrium, which is absorbed by prices, since supply of 
dwelling is given in the short run. The existence of a new level of housing prices 
creates an incentive to property developers to alter the supply of housing over a longer 
period. As a result, there is a change in the flow of new residential assets, which 
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modifies the supply of housing. At the same time, a strong effect in terms of 
unemployment and income emerges, which is related to construction activities. In this 
context, households determine the volume of housing assets that they desire to acquire 
and apply for bank credit to enable them to purchase of this asset. Changes in housing 
prices modify the share of households who are able to enter the market, which finally 
affects demand for housing and ‘feeds’ this cycle. The system collapses when the 
banking sector perceives a high level of households’ indebtedness that induces a 
tightening of credit standards and increases in interest rates since borrowers’ risks are 
higher. As a result, there is a decline in housing demand and adjustment emerges until 
a new position of equilibrium is reached. 
 In this context, the main determinant of housing prices is real disposable 
income, YD. More precisely, the demand for housing is driven by dwelling 
affordability, which is defined as the income-to-price ratio (OECD, 2005).
1
  Any 
increase in households’ income that makes more affordable to purchase a property 
fuels demand for housing and induces an increase in housing prices appreciation since 
supply of housing is given in the short run. This positive effect, which emanates from 
income, has also been pointed by previous contributors, for example, Bover (1993), 
Poterba (1984) and Klyuev (2008) among others.  
The supply side of the housing market is also important in the determination 
of housing prices, i.e. the role of real residential investment, IR, has to be considered.
2
 
The role that this element plays in the determination of housing prices varies 
depending on the time horizon under consideration. In the short run the housing 
market displays peculiar dynamics, i.e. quantities and prices move in the same 
direction (Igan and Loungani, 2012). More specifically, an increase in real estate 
investment exerts a positive effect on house price appreciation. This is due to the fact 
that increasing households’ desires to purchase housing assets increases the demand 
for housing. This hike in demand drives housing prices up since the supply of housing 
is fixed over this time horizon. This positive relationship is maintained until the point 
is reached where property developers increase the production of dwellings and 
homeowners start to sell their assets in order to materialise those extraordinary capital 
gains that are produced by the high housing prices. As a result, there is an increase in 
the supply of housing, which curbs house price appreciation.  
                                                 
1
The price-to-income ratio can be utilised as an indicator of housing prices overvaluation. Specifically, 
a strong deviation between this ratio and its long-run average could suggest the development of a 
bubble in this market (OECD, 2005).  
2
 Real residential investment captures the flow of real estate assets, which are produced during a given 
time period (Nobili and Zollino, 2012). 
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The relevance of the positive effect that emanates from the volume of banking 
credit, CB, on housing prices cannot be ignored.
3
 The volume of bank credit is a 
reflection of the credit standards, which the Central Bank establishes by means of 
prudential policy. Commercial banks have to identify credit-worthy demand 
according to the conditions defined by the Central Bank and be willing to provide 
those mortgages, which derive from the solvent demand for credit at the rate of 
interest established by the monetary authorities.
4
 Credit standards and the cost of 
external finance are determined by considering the value of households’ collateral, 
which is influenced by housing prices.
5
 In terms of our approach a relaxation in credit 
standards permits the entrance in the housing market of more potential buyers, who 
can obtain those financial resources that are needed to purchase real estate assets. As a 
result, an expansionary shift of demand for housing takes places which fuels housing 
prices. More specifically, the role of credit market as related to the housing market 
has to be discussed in the context of the ‘financial accelerator’ (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1989; Bernanke et al. 1996; Bernanke et al. 1999).  
The ‘financial accelerator’, or ‘credit multiplier’, is supported by three main 
arguments: (a) internal finance is always more affordable than external finance, 
independently of the value of the collateral that backs the loan, which is due to 
lenders’ agency cost; (b) agents’ risk premium is negatively related to their net 
wealth, i.e. internal funds (liquid assets) and collateral (illiquid assets);
6
 (c) a decline 
in agents’ net wealth induces a hike in the risk premium that provokes a rise in the 
volume of external funds that borrowers require and finally slows down borrowers’ 
spending and production (Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Bernanke et al. 1996).
7
  
Specifically, Bernanke et al. (1996) focus on the empirical evidence in which small 
                                                 
3
In our approach the volume of bank credit is approximated by the domestic credit to the private sector 
as a percentage of GDP. 
4
See Lavoie (1984).      
5
There is also an important indirect effect on economic activity through the so called ‘wealth’ effect, 
which emanates from unexpected increases in housing prices. In particular, there is a vast economic 
literature that considers households’ wealth as the main determinant of consumption. In this sense, a 
decline in housing prices induces a decrease to the value of households’ wealth, which mainly 
corresponds to real estate assets. As a result, households reduce their demand for final goods, i.e. a 
decline in consumption takes place, and finally a negative effect on the level of economic activity 
emerges (see, also, Nneji et al., 2013).    
6
 Bernanke et al. (1999) point to the existence of a positive risk premium as a natural phenomenon in a 
banking system characterized by the presence of ‘agency’ problems. 
7
 Bernanke and Gertler (1989) develop a model applied to the channels utilised by firms’ in order to 
finance their investment decisions. Bernanke and Gertler (op. cit.) conclude that the impact of the 
financial accelerator is more powerful in those cases where the economy is in recession. Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) display a dynamic model where procyclical and endogenous changes in the price of the 
assets determine net wealth, the volume of banking credit that firms can withdraw and their spending. 
The Kiyotaki and Moore’s (op. cit.) model considers the existence of credit limits and the evolution of 
assets prices as the main explanatory elements to explain the amplification effect of changes in credit 
on the economy.  
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variations, for example oil price fluctuations or changes in monetary policy, provokes 
an important effect on aggregate economic activity. Bernanke et al. (op. cit.) define 
the ‘financial accelerator’ as the amplification of real or monetary shocks in the 
economy due to variations in credit conditions. This notion suggests that variations in 
credit-market conditions enhance and extend the impact in which emanates from 
monetary or real shocks.
8
 In this context any kind of negative shocks, which curb the 
economic expansion, harden financial conditions and complicate the entrance of 
agents in the credit market, while agents’ credit necessities increase.9 As a result, 
there is a slowdown of spending which accelerate the downturn of the economy.
10
 
Bernanke et al. (1996) also coin the term ‘flight to quality’, which refers to a situation 
where agents have to deal with higher agency cost and as a result the volume of credit 
that they can receive is lower.  
Furthermore, the negative impact of the cost of banking finance, i.e. mortgage 
rates, RM; on housing prices has to be mentioned. The acquisition of a property is the 
main investment decision that households undertake by getting into debt. Economic 
literature suggests that an increase in the mortgage rate reduces the affordability of 
housing assets.
11
 This fact compels some potential buyers to abandon the market. As a 
result, this decline in demand for housing curbs housing prices. The mortgage rate 
accounts for one of the channels through which monetary authorities can affect the 
dynamics of the housing market.
12
  
Moreover, policy makers have an important and effective ‘tool’ to influence 
the evolution of housing prices and avoid the development of bubbles in this market, 
i.e. fiscal policy.
13
 The most powerful channel that fiscal authorities could use in order 
to alter the dynamics of the market is taxation on property.
14
 The justification of this 
                                                 
8
 Eckstein and Sinai (1986) point to the hypothesis that agents tend to be overindebted and in a weak 
position to face cyclical peaks.  
9
 A decline in agents’ net wealth provokes an increase in the cost of external resources, which means a 
fall in borrowers demand for credit. However, at the same time there is an increase in the funds that are 
require to repay the fixed obligations since the volume of internal funds is reduced.  
10
 Bernanke et al. (1996) explain the ‘financial accelerator’ in a context of ‘principal-agent’ conflicts, 
i.e. the ‘financial accelerator’ could be identified with endogenous variations of the agency cost of 
lending. The ‘principal-agent’ framework describes a situation where lenders cannot obtain the 
information that they would know about borrowers without facing a cost.  
11
Iossifov et al. (2008) study the interest rate elasticity of residential housing prices. Iossifov et al. (op. 
cit.) point out that the acquisition of real estate assets is undertaken by means of external finance since 
the price of this asset is a multiple of home buyers’ disposable income. 
12
See de Leeuw and Gramlich (1969) for an explanation of those channels that monetary authorities 
can utilise to influence the housing market. See, also, Shiller (2007) for a discussion of the role played 
by low interest rates in the development of assets bubbles since 1990s. 
13
Fiscal policy could impact the housing market by means of several instruments; for instance, 
reducing mortgage interest payments, subsidies, taxation over property, capital gains levies and public 
expenditure.  
14
Muellbauer (2003) highlights the role of taxation with respect to regulations in the use of land.  
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statement is the fact that a high level of taxation could modify households’ 
preferences for dwelling by making the decision of renting the properties more 
attractive than purchasing them.
15
 Our approach assumes a negative effect of fiscal 
policy on housing prices since an increase in property taxation rises the user’s cost of 
home ownership. This increase curbs the demand for housing and housing prices as a 
result since there are some households who are not interested in purchasing real estate 
assets under the new conditions. According to their preferences to rent the services of 
the asset becomes more profitable than buying the property.
16
 Our proposal follows 
Hilbers et al. (2008) and includes the tax revenues-to-housing prices ratio, T, to 
account for the role of taxation in the housing market.  
Finally, we account for the influence of demographic elements, which are an 
important driver of the demand for housing. On the one hand, there is a positive 
correlation between the growth of population, DPO, and housing prices. A positive 
shock of population, i.e. rising population due to the natural trend of growth of 
population or inflows of immigrants, fuels demand for housing since the share of 
potential buyers that need to consume the services provided by real estate assets is 
higher.
17
 This increase in demand is absorbed by higher prices in the short-run since 
supply is given and property developers cannot satisfy immediately this rising 
demand. This positive relationship is especially strong in those areas, which are 
highly populated, due to the fact that the constraints regarding the availability of land 
to produce new assets, i.e. the supply for housing becomes more inelastic, reinforces 
this mechanism.
18
  
On the other hand, our testable hypothesis includes the negative effect that 
emanates from the presence of unemployment, DUN. Rising unemployment curbs 
demand for housing since those households who loose their employment suffer a 
reduction of their income, which makes less affordable the purchase of the assets.
19
 
Previous contributions, Cameron and Muellbauer (2001), also consider housing 
                                                 
15
See Hilbers et al. (2008) for details of taxation related to the housing market in the vast majority of 
the countries that we analyse in the empirical part of this contribution.  
16
Capozza et al. (1998) emphasize the negative effects of taxation on housing prices and provide 
empirical evidence of this fact by using a sample of 63 metropolitan areas in the United States during 
the period 1970-1990. Haffner and Oxley (2011) discuss the influence of taxation on house price 
volatility in Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
However, Fuest et al. (2004) suggest that taxation on capital gains could raise the volatility of housing 
prices. 
 
17
Holly and Jones (1997) study the impact of demographics in the United Kingdom during the period 
1939-1994. Bover (1993) focuses on the Spanish housing market. 
18
See Miles (2012) who analyses the United Kingdom housing market. 
19
See, also, Ni et al. (2011) who focuses on the role of unemployment in the United States housing 
market and Zhu (2010) for further empirical evidence in the case of the United Kingdom.  
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ownership as a determinant of unemployment, since housing ownership reduces the 
willingness of unemployed workers to move to others areas. Moreover, 
unemployment also exerts other indirect effects in the housing market. For example, 
unemployment is an indicator of the level of economic activity, which is utilised by 
agents in order to elaborate their expectations. Under the presence of this 
phenomenon, some households decide to postpone their investment decisions until the 
moment in which the economic situation changes. At the same time, commercial 
banks will be more reluctant to issue new mortgages in this kind of context since their 
risk perception is growing. All these facts induce a decline in demand for housing, 
which curbs housing prices appreciation. We also may note that rising unemployment 
exert an additional effect on housing prices, since some home owners have to sell 
their assets due to the fact that they cannot repay their mortgages and try to get rid of 
their obligations before defaulting. Additionally, an increase in foreclosures also 
slows down housing prices appreciation.  
The previous discussion can be encapsulated as in equation (1) which 
summarises the testable hypothesis that we utilise for the purposes of the empirical 
part of this contribution:   
),,,,,,( POUNMBRDHH DDTRCIYPP         
                                                                    (1) 
               +   -    +    -   -     -     +         
where PH stands for real housing prices, YD for real disposable income, IR for real 
residential investment, CB for the volume of banking credit, RM for the mortgage rate, 
T for the ratio of taxation to property/house price, DUN for the rate of unemployment, 
and DPO for the evolution of population. The sign below a variable indicates the 
partial derivative of PH with respect to that variable.  
3. Econometric specification 
This section begins with the stationarity of the data under consideration, which 
is checked by means of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller; 1979, 1981) 
tests, the Phillips-Perron (Phillips and Perron, 1988) test and the GLS-based Dickey-
Fuller (Nelson and Plosser, 1982) test. The null hypothesis of these three tests is the 
existence of a unit root. We also apply the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin 
(Kwiatkowski et al., 1992) test, whose null hypothesis is the absence of unit roots, i.e. 
the stationarity of the time series. Unit root/stationarity tests are utilised to check 
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whether the data are integrated of first-order. The justification of this way of 
proceeding is due to the fact that in some cases, for example, if the variable displays 
structural breaks, the unit root/stationarity tests could identify unit roots instead of 
stationarity with structural changes. In our particular case, all these tests suggest the 
presence of unit root, which is the pre-condition in the application of the cointegration 
analysis.
20
 
 Subsequently, we proceed to estimate the proposed relationship by using the 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM; see, for example, Johansen, 1995). In the 
VECM case there is no need to make assumptions about the direction of the causality 
and the existence of temporal causality relationships amongst the variables involved, 
since all variables are jointly determined at the same time. The fact that this technique 
is based on VAR modelling allows the relaxation of the assumptions regarding the 
exogeneity or endogeneity of the explanatory variables.
21
 This approach permits to 
overcome problems of endogeneity of the regressors and reverse causality, which 
cannot be dealt with easily by means of other techniques, such as for example, 
instrumental variables.
22
 In this framework, firstly, we conduct a preliminary test to 
calculate the length of the lag that our VECM computes.
23
 Secondly, we apply the 
Johansen test for cointegration (Johansen, 1988, 1991), which studies the existence of 
relationships among the variables in question and indicates the number of 
cointegrating relationships that can be estimated.
24
 As a result, we proceed to estimate 
the VECM that produces the dynamics in the short run and provides the cointegrating 
parameters in its normalized form, which constitutes a long-run equilibrium 
relationship.
25
 For the particular purpose of this contribution we estimate the VECM, 
which is specified in equation (2):  
ttit
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                                                   (2) 
where PH accounts for real house prices; X is a vector which computes the following 
variables: real disposable income, YD, real residential investment, IR, the volume of 
banking credit, CB;  mortgage rate, RM; the ratio of taxation to property/house price, T, 
                                                 
20
The results of these unit root/stationarity tests are shown in the Appendix. 
21
A VAR (n) is characterized by utilising as explanatory elements of each equation n lags of each 
variable which is included in the model.  
22
Gonzalo (1994) states the superiority of this technique even in those cases where the dynamics of the 
variables are unknown or there is no normality in the residuals.  
23
This test is conducted by means of the STATA command varsoc. 
24
The STATA command vecrank is used to run this test. 
25
The estimation of the VECM is performed by the command vec. 
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the rate of unemployment, DUN, and the population, DPO.  E is the error-correction 
term, ε is a random error term, and β0, α0, φ11 and φ12 are the estimated parameters. All 
the variables are computed in logarithms except the mortgage rate.  
 The validity of the short-run estimations is checked by the standard 
diagnostic/statistics that are reported in previous contributions that apply the same 
econometric technique. More precisely, we present the R-squared (R-sq), the Chi-
squared test (chi2), the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Breusch-Godfrey 
Serial Correlation LM (Breusch, 1979; Godfrey, 1978) statistic, the Schwartz 
Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion 
(HQIC).
26
 
4. Utilised data 
The validity of our testable hypothesis is checked by utilising a sample of 18 
OECD economies during the period 1970-2011. Particularly, the economies under 
consideration are the following: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. This sample permits 
us to conduct a comparative study among the most important developed countries, 
which are different enough in terms of their banking sectors, taxation systems, 
incomes and demographic factors, although their housing cycles are synchronized 
through time. The lack of homogeneous information before 1970 regarding housing 
prices compels us to start our analysis in 1970.
 27
  
The AMECO databank of the European Commission´s Directorate General for 
Economic and Financial Affairs is the principal source of the annual data provided. 
More precisely, the variables employed are the following: (a) Gross Fixed Capital 
Formation by type of Goods at Current Prices (Dwelling);
28
 (b) Gross National 
Disposable Income per Head of Population; (c) Real Long-term Interest Rate;
29
 (d) 
                                                 
26
See Pulido and Pérez (2001) for further details on these tests. 
27
Real Housing Price Index are available at the website of the Bank of International Settlements (BIS): 
http://www.bis.org/ 
28
The OECD databank Gross fixed capital formation, housing is utilised in the case of Norway and 
Switzerland. 
29
The presence of missing information in the AMECO long-term interest rate time series is replaced by 
using the OECD databank for Switzerland, New Zealand, Australia, Norway and Canada. 
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Unemployment Rate; (e) Total Population;
30
 and (f) Gross Domestic Product Price 
Deflactor.
31
  
Furthermore, other data providers have been consulted: the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which offers annual data 
regarding Taxation over immovable property (% of GDP); and the World Bank, 
which publishes Domestic Credit to Private Sector (% of GDP).
32
   
STATA 11 and EViews 5.0 are the econometric packages utilised in order to 
estimate the econometric relationships and derive the relevant statistics/diagnostics.  
 
5. Empirical results 
 
5.1 Preliminary analysis and long-run relationships 
The length of the lag that the VECM includes is selected by applying the 
Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQIC) 
and the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC). We consider a maximum of 
four lags as reasonable to account for the dynamics of this market, especially so since 
annual data is utilized. Such a lag length should be sufficient for the majority of the 
duration of each phase of the cycle.
33
 Another important consideration is that such lag 
length also allows the model to have enough degrees of freedom.
34
 The selected 
length in all cases varies between 2 and 4 lags.
35
   
Table 1 reports the results of the Johansen’s trace test for cointegration 
(Johansen, 1988, 1991) and confirms the existence of one cointegrating equation in 
each case. The first column presents the maximum rank, i.e. the number of 
cointegrating equations that exist among the variables under consideration.
36
 The 
second column shows the values of the log-likelihood function, which are utilised to 
study the possibility of restricting a VAR of a given order to another VAR of lower 
                                                 
30
The OECD databank  Population Statistics provides the missing information in the event of Germany 
from 1970 to 1991. 
31
These time series can be downloaded at:  
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm  
32
These databases can be consulted at:  
http://data.worldbank.org/; http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
33
OECD (2005) points out that the contraction stage of the housing market spans for 5 years while the 
expansionary one could last for up to 6 years. 
34
Our lag length is along the lines of other contributions, which also use annual data; see, for example, 
Holly and Jones (1997). 
35
The results of this test are cited in the Appendix (Table 9). 
36
The rank of a matrix is the number of its characteristic roots, which are different from 0 (Brooks, 
2008). 
11 
 
order. The third column reports the eigenvalues, which are calculated in order to 
conduct the test. The fourth and the fifth columns display the trace statistics and the 
critical values at the 5% significance level. In all the cases we strongly reject the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration. However, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of at 
most there is one cointegrating equation. As a result the output presented in Table 1 
confirms the existence of one cointegrating equation.
 37
 
 
Table 1. Johansen test for cointegration. 
Johansen tests for cointegration          
  maximum rank LL eigenvalue trace statistic 5% critical value 
Australia 1 26.5159 0.5175 24.4202 29.68 
Belgium 1 31.3226 0.5597 21.9956 29.68 
Canada 1 40.3057 0.5871 16.9803 29.68 
Denmark 1 61.5947 0.3750 12.1370 15.41 
Finland 1 129.8274 0.6377 9.0885 15.41 
France 1 292.8084 0.4188 13.9409 15.41 
Germany 1 352.4996 0.4935 21.6469 29.68 
Ireland 1 196.3465 0.3903 12.6203 15.41 
Italy 1 280.2785 0.5333 26.0087 29.68 
Japan 1 323.2638 0.5301 26.2700 29.68 
Netherlands 1 209.5143 0.5117 28.6008 29.68 
New Zealand 1 287.3301 0.6233 25.8829 29.68 
Norway 1 326.00000 0.5417 45.0277 47.21 
Spain 1 254.9385 0.5728 45.5246 47.21 
Sweden 1 217.0000 0.7994 41.8044 47.21 
Switzerland 1 362.5041 0.6576 27.4091 29.68 
UK 1 431.9571 0.6144 45.5785 47.21 
US 1 374.0071 0.5394 29.4883 29.68 
             
 
 
The normalized parameters which are estimated for the cointegrating 
equations are shown in Table 2.
38
  Specifically, the coefficients of the long-run 
relationships are normalized with respect to real housing prices. As a result, the 
parameter on real housing prices is unity.
39
 
 
                                                 
37
 The Johansen’s trace test for cointegration considers as its null hypothesis that the number of 
cointegrating vectors is less than or equal to r. Its alternative hypothesis is that there are more than r 
cointegrating vectors. See, also, Brooks (2008) and StataCorp. (2009), for further details. 
38
Normalizing a given vector means obtaining a proportional vector, relative to the initial one, whose 
magnitude is equal to one (see, also, Brooks, 2008).  
39
The normalization which is applied can be described as follows. If there are r cointegrating 
relationships, at least r
2 
restrictions are needed to identify the free parameters in η. Johansen (1995) 
suggests the following identification scheme:  
)~,(   rI  
where Ir is the r x r identity matrix and 
~
is a (k-r) x r matrix of identified parameters (StataCorp., 
2009).
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Table 2. Long-run relationships. 
Long-run relationship - Normalized cointegrating  coefficients           
  Constant L_PH L_YD L_IR L_CB RM L_T L_DUN L_DPO 
Australia -22.2042 1     -3.4938***  0.3362***  -4.3416***  
Belgium -7.4023 1 -0.7364***     -0.1125**  -4.7702*** 
Canada 3.5053 1 -7.9711***   -12.9195***   15.9202*** 
Denmark -5.2854 1   -0.3535***   -0.2491***  
Finland -8.1336 1     -0.2332***  -2.5805*** 
France -20.5767 1      -0.5292*** -16.0024*** 
Germany -9.3527 1 0.6921*** 0.5585*** -1.1060***     
Ireland -1.5389 1 -0.8667***     0.1396***  
Italy 1.7715 1 -1.4185***     0.9251***  
Japan -23.3930 1 1.8618***  -1.4440***  -1.1231***   
Netherlands 2.3718 1     3.9858*** -2.3811*** -7.2301*** 
New Zealand 5.7959 1 -4.2650***    -1.6773***  4.0455*** 
Norway 1.8573 1 -0.5975*** -0.8599***   -0.3459***  2.2988*** 
Spain -10.0231 1 -4.9821*** 3.40395***   -0.0660***  -4.6614*** 
Sweden 12.8830 1 -2.6284***   -14.2841*** 0.5732***   
Switzerland 102.0127 1 -18.2373***  -6.1358***    52.6011*** 
UK -25.4913 1 0.6446**   -8.8406*** -1.5948***  -17.5986*** 
US 7.2600 1     -0.6380*** 9.3697*** 3.3553***     
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses, in the case of the variables, show the lag(s) of the relevant variable.  
 
The estimated relationships shown in Table 2 point to real disposable income, 
which is one of the main determinants of dwelling affordability, as the most important 
variable in the explanation of housing prices in the long-run. Specifically, the 
cointegrating equations reveal a positive relationship between income and real 
housing prices in the long run in the following economies: Belgium, Canada, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland 
and the United Kingdom.
40
  
  Real residential investment also contributes to explaining housing prices 
development in the long run in the particular cases of Germany, Norway and Spain. 
Demographic elements, are also highlighted since they play an important role in the 
evolution of demand for housing, and are a key element in the determination of real 
housing price appreciation. The relevance of demographics in the explanation of 
housing prices has been suggested by previous contribution such as Miles (2012), 
which is focused on the United Kingdom. In particular, the growth of population 
exerts a significant impact in the case of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, 
the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
Regarding the second demographic variable that our analysis considers, i.e. 
unemployment, these cointegrating relationships confirm that this variable contributes 
                                                 
40
Holly and Jones (1997) also suggest the existence of a cointegrating relationship between housing 
prices and disposable income in the case in the United Kingdom.  
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to the determination of the long-run equilibrium in the cases of Australia, Denmark, 
Finland, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands.
41
  
 An important conclusion of our long-run analysis is the fact that fiscal 
authorities by means of taxation could develop a more important role than monetary 
authorities by manipulating interest rates.
42
  In particular, there is a significant impact, 
which emanates from mortgages rates just in Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom 
and the United States. However, taxation over immovable property contributes to the 
determination of the long-run equilibrium relationship in the case of Australia, 
Belgium, Finland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the 
United Kingdom and the United States.  
 Regarding monetary authorities’ actions in this market, our results reveal that 
they can exert a stronger influence by means of prudential policy, i.e. by tightening 
the credit standards. This element, which is proxied by the volume of banking credit, 
is significant in Denmark, Germany, Japan, Switzerland and the United States.    
In general terms, our study confirms the results pointed by Igan and Loungani 
(2012) where it is suggested that housing prices in the long run are mainly determined 
by local fundamentals, namely, growth of population and income. 
5.2. Analysis of the short-run dynamics 
The models that are estimated for the purpose of this contribution in order to 
analyse the dynamics in the short run are shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Short-run equations. 
Short-run Relationship                   
  Constant ∆L_YD ∆L_IR ∆L_CB ∆RM ∆L_T ∆L_DUN ∆L_DPO ∆L_PH EL_PH 
Australia -0.0105       2.2714** (1) 0.5357* (1) -0.1511** 
Belgium 0.0384***     -0.0725** (2)   0.8676*** (1) -0.4070*** 
      -0.0647*(3)   0.4486** (3)  
Canada 0.0062        0.4435** (1) -0.0529*** 
Denmark 0.0157      -0.1128*** (1)  0.7938***(1) -0.1563*** 
Finland 0.1506***     -0.1816** (2)   0.9903*** (1) -0.4921** 
France 0.0151**      -0.1913** (2)  0.9458*** (1) -0.0777*** 
         -0.3833*** (2)  
Germany -0.0055   0.3140* (2)     0.5650*** (1) -0.1604*** 
Ireland 0.0141        0.6396*** (1) -0.2640*** 
Italy -0.0002 1.1754** (2)       0.4526*** (2) -0.5555*** 
  1.6457*** (3)       0.2347* (3)  
                                                 
41
The role of unemployment in the evolution of housing prices in the long run have been pointed out by 
previous contributions, such as, for example, Barot and Yang (2002). Barot and Yang (op. cit.) find a 
relevant effect of unemployment in the case of the United Kingdom, although in our particular case this 
coefficient is not significant.  
42
Our findings are in the same vein as those of Igan and Loungani (2012) who consider that interest 
rates do not play a very important role in the determination of global housing prices.   
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Japan -0.0104 0.9515*** (1)  0.5065*** (1)     0.3205** (1) -0.0836** 
Netherlands 0.0074        0.6338*** (1) -0.0479*** 
New Zealand -0.0015     -0.3157* (2)  3.0488*** (2) 0.4710*** (1) -0.3806*** 
Norway 0.0333     -0.4220*** (1)  1.2589* (2) 1.3163***(1) -0.4458*** 
      -0.3689*** (2)   0.7205** (2)  
      -0.1985*** (3)   1.3915*** (3)  
Spain 0.0156  0.6472** (1)      0.4748** (1) -0.0884** 
Sweden 0.0014    -2.5317*** (1)    0.6668*** (1) -0.2134*** 
Switzerland -0.0032       1.7194*** (1) 0.5371*** (1) -0.0527*** 
        0.5329** (2) -0.3335*** (2)  
        1.0958*** (3) -0.2360* (3)  
UK -0.0028 1.6433** (1)   -1.3988** (1)    0.3547* (1) -0.1566* 
US 0.0147**    -0.8211* (2)    1.0233*** (1) -0.0873** 
         -0.5121* (2)  
                  -0.6068** (3)   
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses, in the case of the variables, show the lag(s) of the relevant variable.  
 
The VECMs which are shown in Table 3 show how in the short run real 
housing prices in the previous periods are a significant explanatory element of the 
evolution of housing prices in the present. This finding supports the ideas advanced 
by Shiller (2007), which highlight the powerful role of expectations in the formation 
of prices in this market and also emphasize the fact that during booms households 
decide to buy this kind of asset due to speculative reasons. These elements are 
especially relevant in the explanation of the dynamics of Belgium, France, Italy, 
Norway, Switzerland and the United States, where the short-run models insert several 
lags of real housing prices.  
These estimations also reveal a positive effect of real disposable income on 
real housing prices in the case of Italy (1.1754 and 1.6457), Japan (0.9515) and UK 
(1.6433). However, the impact of this variable is much more general in the long run.  
Real residential investment is only significant in the case of Spain (0.6472). 
The effect of this variable in this particular market is maintained regardless of the 
time horizon considered. As discussed in Section 2, in the short run real residential 
investment contributes to fuel housing price appreciation.  
These results also confirm the argument that the relaxation of credit standards 
permits the entrance of new home buyers in the market and favours an increase in the 
demand for housing, which is absorbed by prices. This impact is evident in the cases 
of Germany (0.3140) and Japan (0.5065), where the cointegrating equations also 
highlight the significance of this variable in these economies at the equilibrium 
position. 
Moreover, fluctuations of mortgage rates curb housing price appreciation in 
the case of Sweden (-2.5317), the United States (-0.8211) and the United Kingdom (-
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1.3988). These findings are consistent in the long run, although in a longer time 
horizon our econometric results also pointed to a negative effect in the Canadian case. 
Regarding the intervention of fiscal authorities in this market, our econometric 
results provide empirical evidence of how they can slowdown hikes in housing prices 
by means of taxation over property in the case of Belgium (-0.0725 and -0.0647), 
Finland (-0.1816), New Zealand (-0.3157), and Norway (-0.4220, -0.3689 and -
0.1985). This variable is also significant in the determination of housing prices in the 
equilibrium relationship. 
Finally, we may note that the role of demographics factors in the short-run 
study follows the same pattern that is found in the long-run analysis. The positive 
effect, which emanates from the growth of population, is more important than the 
negative one that appears in the event of unemployment. In particular, unemployment 
is just relevant in Denmark (-0.1128) and France (-0.1913), where this effect is also 
significant in the long run in both markets. However, the evolution of population is a 
driver of housing prices in Australia (2.2714), New Zealand (3.0488), Norway 
(1.2589) and Switzerland (1.7194, 0.5329 and 1.0958). The relevance of this 
demographic factor in those economies is also pointed above in the case of the long-
run analysis. 
The last column in Table 3 reports the value of the error-correction term, 
which indicates the proportion of disequilibria between the short-run dynamics and 
the cointegrating relationship that is dropped out in each period. The estimations show 
how between a 5% and 10% of the disequilibria is eliminated in Canada, France, 
Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and the United States. More dynamic is 
the housing market in Australia, Denmark, Germany, and the United Kingdom where 
the speed of adjustment is around 15%-16%. The differences in disequilibria between 
the short-run and the long-run are reduced slightly faster in the case of Sweden (20%) 
and Ireland (26%). This percentage rises twice in the case of Belgium, New Zealand 
and Norway (between 40-45%). The most dynamic markets of the sample under 
consideration are the Finish and the Italian ones, where the error-correction terms are 
50% and 56% respectively.  
 
Table 4. Short-run equations: Diagnostics/statistics. 
Diagnistic/Statistics           
  R-sq LM (1) LM (2) AIC  HQIC  SBIC 
Australia 0.5400 11.0725 (0.8049) 8.6140 (0.9284) -12.5347 -12.1207 -11.3711 
Belgium 0.8115 14.4587 (0.5645)   13.2798 (0.6522) -14.4834 -13.5778 -11.9146 
Canada 0.3644 10.5187 (0.8381) 16.8928 (0.3925) -19.2850 -18.8717 -18.1333 
Denmark 0.4518 6.7345 (0.6647) 1.1247 (0.9990) -2.2869 -2.0267 -15.6176 
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Finland 0.7589 12.2407 (0.2000) 12.8484 (0.1695) -8.3435 -7.8702 -6.6371 
France 0.7537 5.4317 (0.7951) 8.0472 (0.5294) -13.8644 -13.4665 -12.7554 
Germany 0.5112 12.9895 (0.6735) 17.3518 (0.3632) -17.2251 -16.5658 -15.3720 
Ireland 0.7701 11.4062 (0.2488) 16.2195 (0.0624) -9.1972 -8.9370 -8.4721 
Italy 0.8152 7.2696 (0.6090) 12.0498 (0.2105) -10.9906 -10.4539 -9.4823 
Japan 0.6395 17.6975 (0.3419) 20.5436 (0.1967) -15.1930 -14.7798 -14.0413 
Netherlands 0.6696 10.1914 (0.8564) 12.0381 (0.7413) -9.6060 -9.1920 -8.4424 
New Zealand 0.7781 15.0927 (0.5178) 12.5596 (0.7046) -16.5667 -15.6634 -13.9180 
Norway 0.7625 18.4167 (0.8242) 29.0636 (0.2612) -16.6910 -15.3249 -12.8161 
Spain 0.7007 24.8467 (0.4709) 24.5402 (0.4883) -11.1660 -10.1847 -8.4079 
Sweden 0.7892 18.1561 (0.3148) 18.1749 (0.3137) -13.7921 -13.4159 -12.4856 
Switzerland 0.9092 6.3034 (0.9844) 31.1308 (0.0129) -17.6312 -16.7256 -15.0624 
UK 0.4853 29.5902 (0.2400) 28.9812 (0.2647) -20.1516 -19.5547 -18.4880 
US 0.8142 15.6865 (0.4750)   12.5552 (0.7049) -17.8862 -16.9806 -15.3174 
 
The first column of Table 4 shows the value of the R-squared. In the case of 
Canada and Denmark the model displays the less powerful adjustment (36 and 45%). 
This statistic explains half of the variation in housing prices in the United Kingdom, 
Germany, and Australia (49%, 51% and 54% respectively). In the case of Japan this 
percentage is higher (64%) and slightly superior in the event of the Netherlands (67%) 
and Spain (70%). The statistic also explains around the 80% of the short-run 
fluctuations of real housing appreciation in France (0.75), Finland (0.76), Ireland 
(0.77), New Zealand (0.78), Norway (0.76), Sweden (0.79), Belgium (0.81), Italy 
(0.82) and the United States (0.81). The higher adjustment is reached in the case of 
the Swiss market (91%). The second and the third columns of Table 4 display the 
results of the the Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM (Breusch, 1979; Godfrey, 
1978) statistic, which tests for the lack of autocorrelation of first- and second-order. In 
all the cases the null hypothesis of absence of autocorrelation is accepted. Moreover, 
the last 3 columns of this table display the value of the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC), the Schwartz Bayesian Information Criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan-Quinn 
Information Criterion (HQIC). All these statistics permit to select the specification 
that fits in well with the structure of the data. These criteria are utilised in those cases 
where there are several alternatives for the same model. Particularly, econometric 
literature (Pulido and Pérez, 2001) recommends choosing that model, which presents 
the lower value of this statistic. All these diagnostics/statistics validate our theoretical 
and econometric analyses. 
 
6. Comparison with other cross-country studies 
 
We also check the validity of our findings by comparing them with the results 
of previous contributions.  
17 
 
 Regarding the role of income in the evolution of dwelling prices, Miles and 
Pillonca (2008) find a positive relationship between real house appreciation and real 
income growth in the case of Norway, Ireland, the Netherlands and Italy. These 
findings are supported by our cointegrating equations in all cases except for the 
Netherlands. Moreover, Miles and Pillonca (2008) emphasise the positive effect, 
which emanates from an increase in population in Spain and the United States. André 
(2010) also highlights the same effect in the case of Ireland, Spain, New Zealand, 
Canada and the United States. Our long-run results suggest the same impact in these 
countries except for the United States and Ireland where the evolution of population 
has no influence in the long-run equilibrium relationship. 
Furthermore, the role of the supply side of the housing market has also been 
discussed by André (2010), who analyses the impact of residential investment on real 
house prices and points to a strong relationship between these two variables in the 
case of Ireland, Spain, Canada and the Nordic economies. Our results also confirm the 
existence of a relationship between these elements in the case of Spain and Norway.  
To continue with the review of our results, we compare our short-run 
estimations with those of Igan and Loungani (2012).
43
 Specifically, Igan and 
Loungani (op. cit.) find that housing prices are explained by the evolution of 
population and long-term interest rates in Belgium, while in France the determinants 
are income, population, and long-term interest rate. However, our estimations point to 
taxation and unemployment as the explanatory elements in Belgium and France 
respectively. We may note that the lack of impact of credit in France and Belgium, 
which is found by Igan and Loungani (2012) and also pointed out by Hilbers et al., 
2008) support our estimations. 
 Igan and Loungani’s (2012) results advance some findings that are along the 
lines suggested by our estimations as reported in the previous relevant section. For 
example, in the case of Australia, New Zealand and Norway both contributions 
consider a positive relationship between housing prices and population. The common 
driver, which is identified by both studies for the German and the Japanese markets, is 
credit. There is also a positive common effect of income in the United Kingdom and 
Japan. Moreover, the effect of interest rates that is suggested by our empirical 
                                                 
43
Igan and Loungani (2012) model housing prices as a function of dwelling affordability, income per 
capita, working-age population, stock prices, credit, short-term interest rates and long-term interest 
rates. Their sample spans from 1970 to 2010. The inclusion of housing affordability, lagged one period, 
is considered as an error-correction term. This is in view of the use of their contribution to compare it 
with our short-run models.   
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findings in the cases of Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States is 
supported by the above mentioned study.  
However, our results do not exhibit common elements with Igan and Loungani 
(2012) in the case of Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain 
and Switzerland. For instance, our empirical results show how in the short run the 
error-correction term and lagged housing prices are the unique drivers of housing 
price dynamics in Canada, Ireland and the Netherlands. However, Igan and Loungani 
(2012) find that housing prices are explained by income, credit, short-term interest 
rates in the Netherlands; by income and credit in Ireland; and by long-term interest 
rates and income in Canada. In the Spanish case, the Igan and Loungani’s (2012) 
model concludes that housing prices are determined by means of the evolution of 
working-age population and credit, while our estimations capture the impact of real 
residential investment. Moreover, in the case of Switzerland Igan and Loungani (op. 
cit.) highlight income and long-term interest rate as the important explanatory 
elements; in the case of our results a significant positive impact of the rate of growth 
of population is found.  
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
 
A model for the determination of housing prices is proposed in this 
contribution. The impact of traditional variables such as income, interest rates of loans 
for housing and demographics is found important. Our theoretical proposition also 
includes the role of two participants in this particular market, i.e. fiscal and monetary 
authorities. The validity of our testable hypothesis is checked by means of 
cointegration analysis.  
The results of our research show different channels through which public 
authorities can influence the housing market. First, the most important instrument that 
they can utilise is fiscal policy. Specifically, they can alter income, which is the key 
determinant of the demand for housing, the engine of the model, by means of taxation 
over income, e.g. personal income tax and imputed rental levies, such as subsidies, 
e.g. mortgage interest deductibility, and public expenditure. This tool becomes really 
important after the recent bust of the housing market, since any kind of public attempt 
to contribute to the recovery of the sector should emanate from an improvement of 
households’ income. Second, taxation over property cannot be ignored as a relevant 
factor to change households’ preference for real residential assets. As pointed out by 
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Muellbauer (2003), this sort of policies is much more effective than regulation of the 
use of land. In particular, a high level of property and wealth taxation could 
discourage households to purchase real estate assets, since renting properties becomes 
a more attractive option. At the same time, the acquisition of a second or a third 
residence could be curbed by a relevant levy. Another powerful instrument, which 
could also be used is capital gains taxation. Moreover, fiscal authorities should 
encourage the rental market as another measure to curb demand for housing among 
those households who are more inclined to default if the conditions of the economy 
change unfavorably, i.e. low-income individuals who are more likely to become 
unemployed.   
 On the other hand, our results point to the ineffectiveness of monetary policy, 
in the form of interest rate manipulation. In this sense, interest rates should be settled 
as low and stable as possible, since the banking sector has to provide the liquidity, 
which is required to permit the functioning of the sphere of production without 
creating distortions. At first sight, this policy recommendation could be controversial. 
However, monetary authorities may develop more important tasks in terms of 
prudential policy in order to guarantee a credit-worthy demand for credit and as a 
result the solvency of the banking sector. 
 Finally, monetary authorities should also consider the evolution of housing 
prices in order to define their objectives and the instruments that they can utilise to 
achieve them. This recommendation is easily justified by the recent ‘great recession’ 
outcomes, which clearly reveal that financial and macroeconomic instability is related 
to sharp fluctuations in asset prices.  
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Appendix. Unit root/cointegration tests. 
 
Table 5. ADF unit root tests. 
  L_PH L_YD L_IR L_CB RM L_T L_DUN L_DPO 
Australia -5.2982*** (4) 2.8507 (2) -3.0046 (4) -1.8183 (0) -1.3664 (0) -2.5085** (1) -3.2112** (0) -1.9483 (1) 
Belgium -1.9236 (1) -2.1387 (1) -3.1985* (2) -1.9048 (0) -1.2442 (0) -2.6511 (0) -5.0267*** (3) 4.0261 (6) 
Canada -1.9527 (1) -2.9846 (1) -2.2427 (0) -2.5910 (0) -1.2622 (1) -2.0765 (1) -2.5685*** (1) -2.0788 (1) 
Denmark -2.1652 (1) -3.5972** (1) -2.3749 (1) -1.3862 (0) -2.2578 (0) -3.4438* (1) -3.0947** (1) -2.1944 (3) 
Finland -3.5550** (1) 1.5589 (1) -0.8840 (2) -3.5621** (3) -2.3028 (0) -2.3944** (0) -3.2104* (1) 3.3692 (2) 
France -2.1129 (1) -2.7555 (1) -2.2725 (1) -0.4765 (9) -4.3638*** (5) -1.8727* (1) -3.2812** (0) 3.7014 (2) 
Germany -1.7289 (1) -1.8246 (1) -2.7355 (1) -1.9252 (0) -3.7681*** (0) -2.1154 (0) -2.7397* (4) -2.2269 (5) 
Ireland -2.8944 (1) -2.1575 (1) -2.2796 (2) 0.4095 (0) -3.2084** (0) -2.5119 (1) -2.2447 (1) -3.0614 (4) 
Italy -4.0186** (2) -3.1770** (1) -2.8449 (1) -0.7788 (1) -1.3782 (0) 0.5694 (2) -2.3195 (1) -2.3691 (5) 
Japan -0.4896 (1) -2.0642 (1) -2.4718 (1) 0.0255 (1) -2.9577** (0) -2.192392 (0) -2.6748 (1) 0.1779 (3) 
Netherlands -2.8046 (1) -2.1906 (1) -2.4260 (1) -0.2040 (0) -0.7889 (1) -2.0560** (1) -0.6375 (2) 0.6078 (3) 
New Zealand -2.3279 (1) -1.7200 (0) 0.6546 (0) -1.6181 (0) -1.3500 (1) -0.9109 (0) -2.5938 (3) 9.8908 (0) 
Norway -1.8988 (1) 4.2215 (0) -2.4629 (1) -2.9146 (1) -3.9414*** (0) -1.3153 (0) -2.1364 (2) 2.5942 (7) 
Spain -5.2982 (4) -3.1179 (1) -2.4507 (1) -1.1083 (2) -1.9446* (0) -1.8180* (0) -1.3114 (1) -3.6149** (3) 
Sweden -1.9236 (1) -2.1387 (1) -3.1985* (2) -2.6286 (1) -1.2442 (0) -1.7784* (1) -1.0481 (2) -2.8573 (3) 
Switzerland -3.1067** (1) -3.6571** (1) -4.4112*** (1) -0.9041 (0) -2.6670* (0) -0.6591 (0) -3.0330 (1) 2.3807 (4) 
UK -3.2409* (1) -1.8444 (1) -3.7694** (4) -1.0527 (0) -3.9414*** (5) -3.5008* (1) -2.2180 (1) 0.1731 (1) 
US -3.6876***  (4) -4.0024*** (1) -2.9723 (1) -2.1399 (0) -0.7972 (0) -3.0964 (1) -3.3553** (1) -3.4019* (1) 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses show the lag(s). 
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Table 6. PP unit root tests. 
  L_PH L_YD L_IR L_CB RM L_T L_DUN L_DPO 
Australia 1.2548  3.6532 -3.6700**  -1.9854 -1.4142  -2.1255  -2.5275 -3.9359**  
Belgium 2.3425  -1.6859  -2.3145  -2.0152  -1.2059 -2.6728  -2.1406  4.5198  
Canada 2.1357  -2.5512  -2.5907  -2.5640  -1.5024  -0.7504  -2.2257 -3.3161*  
Denmark 1.3458  -2.5051  -2.0444  -1.4538  -2.1041  -2.6968  -2.9726 5.1887  
Finland -1.5856  -2.4659  -2.3806  -1.5962  -2.3147  -1.6973  -2.1353  13.2134  
France 1.7714  -2.6358  2.0110  -5.3414***  -0.9212  -1.9943**  -1.6198  -1.9510 
Germany -1.5441  -2.5057  1.5860  -1.7097  -3.7681***  -2.3388  -3.7432*  1.1653 
Ireland 0.9552  1.9107  -0.7761  0.4095 -3.0253** -1.6191* -0.8230  4.5151  
Italy 1.0434  0.5517  -2.2624  0.2402  -1.3683  0.9328  -1.9986  3.0464  
Japan -0.1551  -2.3242  -2.4382  -2.0162  -2.9577**  -2.5143 -2.3805**  3.1115 
Netherlands 1.3464  3.3170  1.5892  -0.2040  -1.0443  -1.7624*  -1.4375  9.9951 
New Zealand 2.0443  -1.7601  0.4314  -1.7802  -1.7130*  -1.3810  -2.6198*  7.7153 
Norway -1.3014  4.3478  0.9945  -2.1658  -3.7533**  -1.4626  -1.8575  2.8295  
Spain 1.2548  -1.0645  1.0127  0.6697  -2.0825**  -1.7295  -2.0918**  4.5768  
Sweden 2.3425  -1.6859  -2.3145  -4.0937**  -1.2059  -1.7467*  -1.2369  1.4030  
Switzerland 0.6506  -2.9847  -2.4126  -0.9407  -2.7447* -0.7894  -1.3230  2.3064 
UK 2.0946  3.5358  1.2009  -1.0553  -3.1832**  -2.5472 -2.2351  2.3898  
US 0.8208  -2.6700  -1.8573  -2.1399  -0.8694  -1.4585  -2.1132  -1.4551  
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. 
 
Table 7. KPSS unit root tests. 
  L_PH L_YD L_IR L_CB RM L_T L_DUN L_DPO 
Australia 0.0828 0.1638** 0.0812 0.7598*** 0.1590** 0.1049 0.2586*** 0.8172*** 
Belgium 0.1720** 0.8011*** 0.6802** 0.7430*** 0.1574 0.6401** 0.3824* 0.7742*** 
Canada 0.1183 0.1036 0.0867 0.6990** 0.1673 0.4394** 0.1895** 0.1846** 
Denmark 0.1753** 0.7850*** 0.1796** 0.1649** 0.1680** 0.1479** 0.1800** 0.1671** 
Finland 0.5690** 0.7717*** 0.7011** 0.4796** 0.1837** 0.1205* 0.1199* 0.1531** 
France 0.1494** 0.1605** 0.1706** 0.4768** 0.1682** 0.1819** 0.1996** 0.1217* 
Germany 0.1742** 0.1802** 0.0926 0.7429*** 0.2174 0.1916** 0.3629* 0.6604** 
Ireland 0.1437* 0.1293* 0.5652** 0.7138** 0.1373* 0.4067* 0.1679 0.1260* 
Italy 0.0638 0.2092** 0.1543** 0.2008** 0.1563** 0.1355* 0.1841** 0.1541** 
Japan 0.1935 0.7158** 0.3685* 0.1655** 0.1937 0.1324* 0.7493* 0.7405*** 
Netherlands 0.1463** 0.1491** 0.1944** 0.1360* 0.1689 0.1895** 0.1828** 0.1770** 
New Zealand 0.1761** 0.1579** 0.1209* 0.1191* 0.1845** 0.1636** 0.1961** 0.1504** 
Norway 0.1670** 0.1482** 0.3640* 0.6568** 0.2047** 0.5087** 0.1786** 0.1922** 
Spain 0.0828 0.1166 0.1323* 0.1755** 0.1873 0.1339* 0.1706** 0.1212* 
Sweden 0.1720** 0.8011*** 0.6802** 0.6055** 0.1578** 0.6193** 0.6526** 0.1220* 
Switzerland 0.1250 0.7695*** 0.7614*** 0.1728** 0.1486** 0.0822 0.6134** 0.1669** 
UK 0.1089 0.1002 0.1091 0.7483*** 0.1659** 0.5837** 0.1687** 0.2071** 
US 0.0828 0.0579 0.6648** 0.1650* 0.1836 0.6421** 0.1128 0.8108*** 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively.  
 
Table 8. DF GLS Unit Root Tests. 
  L_PH L_YD L_IR L_CB RM L_T L_DUN L_DPO 
Australia -3.3434** (2) 1.1423 (2) -3.6010** (0) -1.6032 (0) -1.9360 (0) -1.8083 (0) -1.4236 (0) -2.4147 (1) 
Belgium -2.0048 (1) -2.1111 (1) -2.6687 (1) -1.9716 (0) -2.0735 (0) -2.7368 (0) -1.3443 (2) 0.7741 (1) 
Canada -2.1178 (1) -2.4168 (1) -2.0962 (0) -2.5001 (0) -2.2776 (0) -2.6380 (1) -2.2917 (1) -0.2323 (1) 
Denmark -2.2287 (1) -3.5565 (1) -2.2909 (1) -1.3344 (0) -1.2409 (1) -3.4572** (1) -1.7794 (0) -2.6407 (3) 
Finland -0.8754 (2) -0.1569 (1) -0.2047 (2) -1.0337 (1) -2.4291 (0) -1.6634 (0) -1.9408 (2) 0.7674 (3) 
France -2.2348 (1) -1.7994 (1) -2.3828 (1) -2.1686 (9) -3.5029** (5) -2.1383 (1) -1.0903 (1) -2.1144 (3) 
Germany -2.2903 (1) -1.8512 (1) -2.7920 (1) -2.2148 (3) -3.0444* (0) -2.6613 (1) -0.6728 (2) -2.7134 (5) 
Ireland -1.1051 (2) -2.3189 (1) -2.0048 (1) 1.4717 (0) -2.6496 (1) -2.0251 (1) -2.2024 (1) -2.0772 (2) 
Italy -3.7382** (2) -0.4867 (1) -2.4839 (1) -1.0405 (1) -1.9224 (0) 0.7314 (2) -1.7716 (1) -1.9400 (6) 
Japan -1.4141 (1) -0.4805 (1) -1.2742 (1) -0.8347 (1) 2.2093** (0) -2.2777 (4) -2.4307 (1) -0.0403 (3) 
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Netherlands -2.8477 (1) -2.2512 (1) -2.4307 (1) -1.5596 (0) -1.8574 (0) -1.3214 (1) -1.9553 (1) -0.2803 (3) 
New Zealand -2.4246 (1) -1.8206 (0) -1.5781 (0) -1.7367 (0) -1.5606 (1) -2.2838 (1) -1.6523 (3) -2.2003 (1) 
Norway -2.0006 (1) 1.4193 (0) -2.6210 (1) -2.7619 (1) -1.6099 (2) -2.3884 (5) -1.4106 (2) -1.9465 (9) 
Spain -0.9843 (1) -3.2967** (1) -2.7727 (1) -1.9023 (1) -2.0731 (0) -2.4631 (1) -1.6671 (1) -0.5844 (2) 
Sweden -2.0048 (1) -2.1111 (1) -2.6687 (1) -2.7371 (1) -2.0735 (0) -1.5157 (1) -0.8992 (2) 0.8594 (4) 
Switzerland -3.3277** (1) -3.6350** (1) 0.6439 (2) -1.0659 (0) -3.0205* (0) -1.3375 (0) -0.9702 (1) -1.0799 (5) 
UK -3.3294** (1) -2.1384 (1) -3.0074* (1) -1.5648 (0) -3.3030** (5) -1.3238 (2) -1.8282 (1) -2.1073 (1) 
US -4.0891*** (4) -3.9661*** (1) -3.1131* (1) -1.8145 (0) -1.5798 (2) -1.0921 (1) -2.1861 (2) -0.7498 (2) 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance and rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively. Numbers in parentheses show the lag(s). 
 
 
 
Table 9. Lag selection. 
Selection-order criteria       
  lag AIC HQIC SBIC 
Australia 2 -12.7037 -12.1517 -11.1523 
Belgium 4 -15.0459 -14.0022 -12.0860 
Canada 2 -19.0799 -18.5273 -17.5125  
Denmark 2 -3.4588 -3.1365  -2.5445   
Finland 4 -8.7783   -8.2509  -6.8768 
France 2 -14.3994 -14.0774 -13.4944  
Germany 3  -17.8332    -17.0351 -15.5693   
Ireland 2 -9.3157 -8.9543  -8.4199 
Italy 4  -14.3582  -13.3144 -11.3976   
Japan 4 -16.4367  -15.3930 -13.4761   
Netherlands 2 -10.0907 -9.5380   -8.5071 
New Zealand 4 -15.7876  -14.7466 -12.7349  
Norway 4  -17.7750 -16.1634 -13.2035   
Spain 3 -11.7462  -10.5183 -8.2631   
Sweden 2 -14.0897 -13.3233  -11.4284   
Switzerland 4 -18.2001 -17.1564  -15.2395  
UK 2 -20.8103  -19.9661 -18.4157   
US 4 -18.2444  -17.2006  -15.2838   
